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Senior DoD leadership, under the banner of acquisition reform, seek change in the 
acqusition process and within acquisition programs to reduce program cycle-time and 
total ownership cost. Key to achieving acquisition reform is the program manager (PM). 
PMs are tasked with the overall responsibility for their program's cost schedule and 
performance goals. The DoD 5000 Series encourages PMs to, "continually search for 
innovative practices that reduce cycle-time, reduce cost, and encourage team-work", yet 
little is contained in the DoD 5000 Series or any other acquisition documents to assist the 
PM in understanding or achieving innovation. In this exploratory study, the author chose 
five previous PMs known for successful innovation and interviewed them about their 
innovations. In an effort to aid future PMs, interview data are compared and analyzed to 
produce preliminary acquisition innovation "best practices". 
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I.        INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to search for ways to improve the 
acquisition process. Why? Many studies have found that most defense acquisition 
programs fail to meet cost and schedule objectives (Cancian, 1995; Holland, 1998; 
Laurent, 1998; Stinson, 2000; and Thompson & Jones, 1994). The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) has addressed this 
deficiency by declaring cost and cycle-time reduction the primary focus of current 
acquisition reform initiatives (Gansler, 1998). 
Many of the laws, regulations and policies governing the defense acquisition 
process have been rewritten to support acquisition reform. Arguably, the most important 
DoD acquisition regulation is what is referred to as the DoD 5000 series documents. It 
has two basic parts, DoD 5000.1, Defense Acquisition, and DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory 
Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated 
Information System (MIAS) Acquisition Programs (DoD, 1996a; DoD, 1996b). The 
first, DoD 5000.1, states the policies and principles for all DoD acquisition programs and 
identifies key acquisition officials and forums. Additionally, it authorizes DoD 5000.2-R 
and, in accordance with OMB Circular A-109, it establishes a "disciplined yet flexible 
management approach for acquiring quality products that satisfy the operational user's 
needs" (DoD, 1996a, p.l). The second, DoD 5000.2-R, establishes "a simplified and 
flexible management framework for translating mission needs into stable, affordable, and 
well-managed...[defense] Programs" (DoD, 1996b, p.l). It contains the mandatory 
procedures applicable to all defense programs. 
One of the keys to achieving acquisition reform goals (reduced cycle time and 
reduced cost) appears to be innovation, as alluded to in much of the recent literature 
written about defense acquisition. (See Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Gansler, 
1998), Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) (Gansler, 1998), internet-based acquisition 
(Dunn, 1998), Alpha Contracting (Schütter, 1998), Single Process Initiative (SPI) 
(Bergan, 1997). The premise of all of these reform efforts is to change from current 
practices and try something new (i.e., innovate) to achieve acquisition reform goals. 
Knight (1967) describes the process of innovation as "a special case of the 
process of change in an organization." The term innovation thus can be used in several 
contexts. In one case, it is synonymous with invention, or the creation of a new 
configuration from two or more previously existing concepts (Zaltman, Duncan & 
Holbek, 1973). In another, it is used to describe the process whereby an idea becomes 
innovation through a process of adoption and internalization (Zaltman, Duncan & 
Holbek, 1973). Thirdly, innovation can refer to "that idea, practice, or material artifact 
that has been invented.. .independent of its adoption or non-adoption" (Zaltman, Duncan 
& Holbek, 1973, p.8). This thesis will focus on innovation as either a process or a 
product. I will use Mohr's (1969) classic definition of innovation: "the successful 
introduction into an applied situation of a means or ends that are new to that situation." 
B.        PURPOSE 
Central to accomplishing Acquisition Reform goals is the program manager (PM). 
The role of the program manager (PM) in the defense acquisition process is found in the 
DoD 5000.1. To summarize, it states the PM is has overall responsibility for the cost, 
schedule and performance objectives of the program. Additionally, it "encourages PMs 
to continually search for innovative practices that reduce cycle time, reduce cost, and 
encourage teamwork" (DoD, 1996a, p.7). Little is contained in the entire DoD 5000 
Series to assist the PM in understanding or achieving innovation. 
If we are to achieve acquisition reform goals, PMs will have to find more 
innovative "ends" and "means" within defense acquisition programs. How do PMs 
successfully manage innovation in defense acquisition programs? Information and 
assistance regarding innovation in defense acquisition programs is needed to provide the 
PM with a framework to understand innovation. PMs must understand their role as a 
public entrepreneur who moves an innovative idea through a process to achieve 
innovation. They also must be aware of the barriers to innovation, and strategies used in 
defense acquisition programs to achieve innovation. 
My thesis will focus on the PM as a public entrepreneur. I will attempt to identify 
strategies used by PMs to complete an innovation. In this exploratory study, I will 
interview subjects (PMs) who have demonstrated innovation in their programs. Through 
comparison and analysis of subjects' responses to interview questions, I hope to provide 
innovation "Best Practices" or heuristics to assist future PMs in managing innovative 
programs. 
C.        RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is: How do program managers 
(PMs) successfully manage innovation in defense acquisition programs? 
Secondary research questions include: 
1. Who innovates in major defense acquisition programs? 
2. What kinds of innovations occur in defense acquisition programs? 
3. What are the barriers to innovation in defense acquisition programs? 
4. Do PMs use strategies to innovate? If so, what strategies are employed by 
PMs? What are the relationships between their strategies, innovations and 
barriers? 
D.        SCOPE 
This thesis includes a review of organizational innovation and public 
entrepreneurship theory. From this review, generalizations regarding innovation in DoD 
acquisitions can be made and subject interview questions developed. Analysis of the 
interview subjects' responses provides comparisons among subjects and comparisons to 
generalizations formulated from the literature. The thesis concludes with 
recommendations and program management "rules of thumb for innovation" to aid future 
PMs. 
According to Snider (2000, p.22), thesis research involving responses from 
program managers and other acquisition professionals contain "findings that have 
practical as well as theoretical significance." It is described as the theory-practice 
connection (Snider, 2000). In addition to increasing the acquisition lessons learned body 
of knowledge, I anticipate this research will assist the PM in the formulation and 
execution of successful innovation plans. 
E.   METHODOLOGY 
This thesis research consisted of the following steps: 
1. An extensive literature search of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, 
and other library information resources. 
2. A review of organizational innovation, public entrepreneurship, and change 
agent theories. 
3. The development of interview questions to obtain data to answer primary and 
secondary research questions. 
4. A review of the major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) that involved 
innovation. The identification ofPMs associated with the innovation. The 
selection, if possible, of subjects formally recognized for innovation, or whose 
program received formal recognition as being innovative. 
5. Personal interviews with the chosen subjects. (All but one was conducted 
face-to-face; the exception was a phone interview.) 
6. Analysis of subject responses. Identification of individuals involved in 
innovation, their strategies, and barriers to innovation. 
7. Comparison of subjects' responses were compared with theory drawn from 
the literature review and to one another. 
8.   Data analysis and summary of the heuristics to aid future PMs. 
F.        ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I, Introduction, specifies the need for PM innovation to achieve DoD's 
acquisition reform goals. In addition, this chapter outlines the primary and secondary 
research questions, the study's scope and methodology, and presents an overview of the 
thesis. 
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides definitions of innovation and public 
entrepreneurship. It discusses defense acquisition programs from the perspective of 
theories of organizational innovation and public entrepreneurship. The process of 
achieving innovation from idea to organizational integration and acceptance (innovation) 
is examined. The concept of a public entrepreneur as the agent that moves an idea 
through the innovation process is reviewed. 
Chapter III, Methodology, describes the research methodology used to conduct 
this study. 
Chapter IV, Data, summarizes the responses of each interview subject. 
Chapter V, Analysis, discusses, compares and analyses the subjects' responses to 
interview questions. PM innovation heuristics and lessons learned are developed and 
formalized. 
Chapter VI, Conclusions and Recommendations, restates primary and secondary 
research questions, summarizes findings and states research limitations. Finally, 
recommendations for further study are offered. 
II.       LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Innovation requires both an innovative idea and someone to promote the idea. 
There are two interrelated but distinct processes at work (Roberts and King, 1996). The 
first process is when an idea develops into a full-blown innovation. The second is the 
process of entrepreneurship, when an entrepreneur engages in certain activities to move 
the idea from inception to organizational practice. This chapter provides an overview of 
innovation in organizations and public entrepreneurship noting the relationship between 
the two processes. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 
Many definitions of innovation exist in the literature. It is important for this 
thesis to define innovation as it relates to PMs and defense acquisition programs. It is 
also important to describe the various types of innovation and the phases an idea 
progresses through to become innovation. 
1. Innovation Defined 
Knight (1967, p.479) describes the process of innovation as "a special case of the 
process of change in an organization. The two differ only in the novelty of the outcome." 
The term innovation can be used in several contexts. In one case, it is synonymous with 
invention, or the creation of a new configuration from two or more previously existing 
concepts (Zaltman, Duncan & Holbek, 1973). In another, it is used to describe the 
process whereby an idea becomes innovation through a process of adoption and 
internalization (Zaltman, Duncan & Holbek, 1973). Thirdly, innovation can refer to "that 
idea, practice, or material artifact that has been invented.. .independent of its adoption or 
non-adoption" (Zaltman, Duncan & Holbek, 1973, p.8). Zaltman, Duncan and Holbeck's 
first two definitions of innovation are most relevant to the nature of this study. Because 
this thesis will focus on innovation as either a process or a product, I will use Mohr's 
(1969, p.l 12) classic definition of innovation: "the successful introduction into an applied 
situation of a means or ends that are new to that situation." 
2.        Innovation and Organizations 
Most relevant to this exploratory study is theory that focuses on the specifics of 
public organization's acceptance of innovation, although theories describing innovation 
in any organization that exhibits bureaucratic behavior are relevant. Innovations and 
organizations have quite a paradoxical relationship; organizations resist innovations, yet 
they need them to change and survive. 
Generally, public organizations resist innovation (Balk, 1995; Davenport, 1993; 
Wilson, 1989) and we ought not be surprised at this fact since innovation, which includes 
some degree of uncertainty and instability, is contrary to the organization which favors 
stability and routine practices (Wilson, 1989). Those organizations with a strong sense of 
mission have a greater resistance to innovation (Wilson, 1989), since the novel idea 
initially challenges the status quo and introduces risk or uncertainty in accomplishing the 
mission. One could argue that there are very few places with as strong a sense of mission 
as the U.S. military. Wilson (1989) posits that incremental (consistent with current task 
definitions) are more likely to be accepted than drastic innovations (innovations which 
require a change in task definitions). 
Innovation occurs in different branches of our Government. Innovation 
associated with laws or statutes is described as innovation by legislative design. 
Innovation through interpretation of law is considered innovation by judicial design. And 
lastly, innovation associated with a policy or program within a public bureau is referred 
to as innovation by organization or management design (Roberts, 1999). Since the PM 
functions within a public bureau, the Department of Defense, innovations in defense 
acquisition programs are by organization or management design. 
3.   Degrees of Innovation 
The literature on organizational innovation suggests two extremes of innovation 
with varying orders of magnitude in-between: incremental and "Big Bang" innovation, 
Gluck (1985). Davenport, a recognized expert on innovation, (1993) labels the first as 
process improvement and the more extreme as process innovation. Gluck's and 
Davenport's models can be combined on the same innovation continuum as depicted in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Innovation Continuum 
Davenport (1993, p.l 1) further defines the difference between the two ends of the 
innovation spectrum by providing characteristics of proposed innovation and 
corresponding indicators to determine the magnitude of innovation achieved (see Figure 




Level of Change Incremental Radical 
Starting Point Existing Process Clean slate 
Frequency of Change One-time/continuous One-time 
Time Required Short Long 
Participation Bottom-up Top-down 
Typical Scope Narrow, within functions Broad, cross-functional 
Risk Moderate High 
Primary Enabler Statistical control Information 
technology 
Type of Change Cultural Cultural/structural 
Figure 2. Process Improvement Versus Process Innovation 
(From: Davenport's "Process Improvement versus Process Innovation", Process 
Innovation, 1993, pg. 11 [Fig 1-3].) 
Unfortunately, measuring the degree of innovation is a very subjective task 
requiring more research and in-depth analysis than is provided in this thesis. Although 
such analysis of defense acquisition innovation would provide interesting and challenging 
research, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
4.        Innovation Phases 
The development of a new idea, from initiation or inception to organizational 
acceptance or implementation, follows a discernible trajectory that can be divided into 
three distinct phases: initiation, design and implementation (Roberts, 1992; Roberts & 
King, 1996). Usually a need or problem within an organization spawns the innovative 
11 
idea; this signifies the beginning of the initiation phase. The second phase, development 
or design, is characterized by a refinement of the idea; a translation of the idea into 
tangible solutions or benefits for the organization. Prototypes of the idea might exist in 
this phase. Finally, during implementation, the idea is accepted and put into practice by 
the organization. This phase continues until the organization decides to keep or reject the 
idea. "If it survives this process, we know it as innovation" (Roberts, 1999, p.92). 
Others suggest that the development of an idea is not so linear or sequential. 
Some ideas follow paths that loop back to other phases (Schroeder et al., 1989) and still 
other ideas can display characteristics of more than one phase at once, suggesting 
simultaneous paths though an organization (Pelz & Munson, 1982). Regardless of the 
path the idea takes, the literature generally agrees that the idea progresses through distinct 
developmental stages. This thesis will use the three phases: initiation, design and 
implementation, posited by Roberts (1992) and Roberts and King (1996), to describe the 
development of defense acquisition program innovations. 
C.        PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The subject of public entrepreneurship has received much attention in recent 
literature. Arguably, public entrepreneurship has reached Government "buzzword" status 
as a result of Osborne and Gaebler's widely read book, Reinventing Government: How 
the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (1992). But like many 
buzzwords used today, the term "public entrepreneurship" is often misunderstood. As it 
relates to defense systems acquisition and PMs, what does public entrepreneurship mean? 
Who are the people we refer to as public entrepreneurs, and how do they innovate? 
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1. Public Entrepreneur Defined 
Like innovation, the public entrepreneurship literature contains many definitions. 
This thesis uses the Roberts and King (1996) definition. "We refer to innovators who 
promote new public policy as public entrepreneurs—individuals who introduce, 
translate, and implement an innovative idea into public practice" (Roberts & King, 1996, 
p.10). 
2. Characteristics of a Public Entrepreneur 
The literature on public entrepreneurship is in agreement that the public 
entrepreneur displays traits of persistence, creativity, tenacity, self-confidence, charisma, 
decisiveness and political astuteness (Doig & Hargrove, 1987; Kingdon, 1984; 
Ramamurti, 1986; Robert & King, 1996). Public entrepreneurs differentiate themselves 
from maintainers, intellectuals, champions and administrators by engaging in the 
innovation process from initiation to successful implementation (Roberts and King, 
1996). In fact, they are credited with "supplying] the energy to move the innovative idea 
through the various phases of the innovation process." (Roberts 1999, p.92) 
Innovations are not always propelled through organizations by individual 
entrepreneurs. "Entrepreneurship has its collective form as well... [individual 
entrepreneurs can join forces and work as a team with other entrepreneurs to push an idea 
through all phases of the innovation process" (Roberts 1999, p.93). Roberts (1999) also 
found that the entrepreneurial process associated with organizational innovation followed 
collective and individual forms, as opposed to legislative innovation, which often follows 
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the collective form. The PM then, has the option to choose either the collective or 
individual form of entrepreneurship to achieve innovation. 
3.        How does a Public Entrepreneur Innovate? 
The literature describes two conflicting courses of action, or modes, for public 
entrepreneurs who innovate in organizations. One mode advises the public entrepreneur 
to innovate through trial and error or "groping along" (Behn, 1988, Golden, 1990). The 
other mode suggests that the public entrepreneur should "systematically analyze and plan 
their way through the innovation process" (Roberts, 1999, p.89). Sänger and Levin 
(1992) argue that the first approach yields only incremental or evolutionary innovation, 
because the entrepreneur is only modifying existing practices. The second approach to 
innovation, due to its strategic and systematic development, yields innovation of a 
revolutionary nature (Roberts, 1992; Roberts and King, 1996; Roberts, 1999). Using 
Davenport's (1993) innovation comparison model, the "groping along" mode would only 
produce process improvement, not process innovation as it involves only incremental 
changes to the status quo. 
Through case studies of innovation by management or organization design 
Roberts (1999) finds the mode that best describes innovation by public entrepreneurs in 
the organizational setting is that of "groping along". 
Here is where the nature of the innovative idea 
becomes important. Entrepreneurs in public bureaus are 
incrementalists. Their comfort zone and ideas do not take 
them far from modest adjustments to the status quo. 
Pushing ideas the represent incremental change has the 
advantage of provoking minimal resistance from the 
organizational members and stakeholders, which in turn 
requires comparatively few resources to sustain the 
14 
entrepreneurial effort. Seen in this light, groping along is 
energy efficient and compatible with the resource-limited 
world of public bureaus. (Roberts, 1999, p. 106) 
D.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Innovation and public entrepreneurship are two, inter-related but distinct, 
processes (Roberts and King, 1996). The first is the process of innovation, when the idea 
moves through various stages to become accepted practice. The second is the process of 
entrepreneurship, when the public entrepreneur develops certain strategies and tactics to 
move the idea through time. Figure 3 provides an illustration of this concept. 
Entrepreneurial Process 
Innovation Idea Idea 







^  I ementation 
Figure 3. Conceptual Map of the Change Process 
(From: Source: Roberts & King, 1996, p.225, figure C.l.) 
PMs, by virtue of their place in the DoD acquisition organization, manage 
innovation in an organizational or managerial context. Innovation by organization design 
could take either a collective or individual form. But it is usually associated with the 
incremental or groping along mode of entrepreneurship (Roberts, 1999). Thus, we 
should find that PMs innovate in defense acquisition programs through individual or 
15 
collective means and their innovations are achieved through trial and error or "tinkering' 
The resulting changes due to their innovations are expected to be incremental. 
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III.      METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the methodology used in the study. The research 
purpose is described, followed by the research methods. This chapter concludes with a 
summary of the steps used in conducting the study. 
B. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
The focus of this thesis is on the program manager—a key figure in achieving 
DoD acquisition reform goals. The objective is to develop a set of heuristics to assist 
future PMs, by studying the actions of those who successfully managed innovative 
programs. Little is written to help program managers innovate—yet they are tasked with 
doing so in the DoD 5000 Series. Detailed analysis of successful defense acquisition 
innovations will not only help future PMs, but also assist DoD in achieving reform goals 
that require nothing less than innovation. 
C. EXPLORATORY STUDY 
1.        Overview 
Since the primary research question to be answered is "how" PMs manage 
innovation in their programs, the best means to answer the question is the use of in-depth 
cases. However, in-depth cases were not practical for this thesis due to resource 
constraints (the limitations and suggestions for further study can be found in Chapter 6, 
Recommendations and Conclusions.). Instead, I chose to interview five innovators in 
Major Acquisition Defense Programs (MDAPs). These interviews should be considered 
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exploratory. Their purpose is to identify major themes and issues for more systematic 
investigation of public entrepreneurship and innovation in the future. 
2. Units of Analysis 
One of the most important components of a research design is the unit(s) of 
analysis. Unit(s) of analysis define the focal point of study and determine the limits of 
data collection and analysis (Yin, 1994). This thesis explores two units of analysis: the 
PM as a public entrepreneur and an innovative idea implemented in practice (defined as 
an innovation). 
3. Development of Interview Questions 
Interview questions evolved from the secondary research questions. Some 
interview questions pertain to multiple secondary research questions. Interview questions 
and their relationship to secondary research questions are depicted in the following 




Related Interview Questions 
"T   Describe an innovation you made as a PM from "inception" to full 
implementation. 
13. Did you inherit any innovative ideas from the previous PM? If so were you 
able to achieve them? Why or why not? 
14. Did you leave any unfinished innovation attempts for your successor? 
15. Do you consider yourself creative? An entrepreneur? 
1. Who innovates 
in major defense 
acquisition programs 
MDAPs)? 
2. What kinds of innovations 
occur in major defense 
acquisition programs 
(MDAPs)? 
3. What are the 
barriers to innovation in 
major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs)? 
1. Describe an innovation you made as a PM from "inception" to full 
implementation. 
2. What were the pros and cons of the new innovation? 
11. Were compromises a part of getting the innovation accepted? What were 
they? How much compromise of the original innovation was needed to achieve 
acceptance? How did you compromise? 
12. Where did the innovation originate? Was it borrowed from another area or 
context? 
17. How much time did you devote to the innovation? 
4. Do PMs use strategies to 
innovate? If so. what 
strategies do they use? What 
are the relationships between 
their strategies, innovations, 
and barriers'' 
3.    What were the attitudes of your superiors, peers and subordinates toward your 
innovation? How did they change over time? 
8. Who were the innovation's opponents? 
9. How did you handle the opponents? 
16. What were the biggest barriers to achieving the innovation? 
17. How much time did you devote to the innovation? 
2. What were the pros and cons of the new innovation? 
3. What were the attitudes of your superiors, peers and subordinates toward your 
innovation? How did they change over time? 
4. Did you have a formal or informal plan to achieve this innovation? If so 
describe. How did the plan changeover time? 
5. Did you develop some sort of proto-type for the innovation? (e.g., computer 
program, pilot program, model) 
6. Who were the innovation's proponents? 
7. How did you use the proponents to help you? 
8. Who were the innovation's opponents? 
9. How did you handle the opponents? 
10. Did your innovation work as anticipated? 
11. Were compromises a part of getting the innovation accepted? What were 
they? How much compromise of the original innovation was needed to achieve 
acceptance? How did you compromise? 
Figure 4. Relationship Between Research and Interview Questions 
4.        Choosing Study Subjects 
Interview subjects were chosen based on their reputation for having successfully 
innovated as a PM. DoD has established several programs to recognize defense 
acquisition programs and acquisition individuals who demonstrate innovation. The 
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Defense Certificate of Recognition for Acquisition Innovation was established to allow 
the service Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) and Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) principals to recognize innovative 
acquisition practices. The David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award is presented 
annually to the DoD civilian or military organization, group or team whose "significant 
contributions.. .demonstrated exemplary innovation and best acquisition practices" (DoD, 
2000 webpage). 
In addition to DoD awards, the Army awards the honor of Program Manager of 
the Year to the PM(s) who best accomplishes DoD, Army, and program acquisition goals. 
Although the award does not explicitly state innovation is one of the criteria for selection 
it is implied, based on the accomplishments of past recipients. 
I chose five PMs associated with programs that received one or more of these 
awards during, or as a result of, their tenure with the program. One of the five PMs 
chosen received the Army's Program Manager of the Year Award. 
All were PMs of Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) programs. ACATI programs 
are Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) or programs designated ACAT I by 
the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). An MDAP is an acquisition program, that is 
estimated by DoD to require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, test 
and evaluation (RDT&E) of more than 355 million in fiscal year (FY) 1996 constant 
dollars or, for procurement of, more than 2.135 billion in FY 1996 constant dollars (DoD 
5000 Series, 1996a). 
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5.        Interviews 
The data were collected through in-person interviews (with the exception of one 
telephonic interview) using a standard questionnaire. A total of five interviews were 
conducted. The interviewees included PMs from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. 
They ranged in rank from a retired Colonel to a newly selected Vice Admiral. 
The interviews took 90 minutes on average; the shortest interview lasted 60 
minutes and the longest approximately 120 minutes. Interview subjects were informed 
prior to the interview that they would be asked about innovations that occurred while they 
were a PM. None of the subjects are currently PMs. I studied each program, during the 
subject's tenure, prior to the interview, but I did not know prior to conducting the 
interview the innovation the subject would discuss. 
The interviews were conducted in the following order: MG Snider, 20 July 2000; 
COL Matthews, 27 July, 2000; RDML Johnston, 10 August 2000; VADM Dyer, 21 
August and 23 August 2000 (two separate phone conversations); and, BGen Feigley, 13 
September 2000. 
D.        CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This is an exploratory study, due to resource constraints. An interview method 
was used to address primary and secondary research questions. The following table 





Identify and analyze of primary research question. 
Conduct a review of organizational innovation and public entrepreneur literature. 
Develop interview questions for subjects to validate theory and obtain data to 
answer primary and secondary research questions. 
Conduct a review of major defense acquisition PMs associated with innovation. 
Select successful PMs as subjects. 
Arrange for and conduct personal interviews with subjects. 
Analyze subjects' responses. Identify those involved in innovation, strategies used, 
and barriers to innovation. 
Compare subjects' responses with theory developed in the literature review. 
8.     Compare subjects' responses with one another. 
9. Develop generalizations and summarize data. 
10. Develop a set of heuristics to aid future PMs. 
Figures. Summary of Methodology 
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IV.   DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and discusses the data collected to understand innovation in 
defense acquisition programs. 
A brief description of each interview subject and his respective program is 
provided, followed by a summary of each individual's responses to the questionnaire. 
The descriptions and questionnaire responses are presented in order of current military 
rank. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS AND THEIR PROGRAMS 
1.        Vice Admiral Dyer and the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet Program 
At the rank of Captain, VADM Dyer was assigned as the PM for the 
F/-18 E/F program from 1994 to 1997. The program was in the end of its Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. The program team received the first 
DoD Acquisition Excellence Award and the Collier Award. 
The F/A-18 E/F program resides in the PMA-265 office with the programs 
responsible for the F/A-18 A through D models and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The 
F/A-18 E/F, also called the Super Hornet, is the nations newest strike fighter. It can be 
configured for one or two pilots. The Super Hornet is an adverse-weather, day and night, 
multi-mission strike fighter with significant survivability features over its predecessors, 
the F/A-18 A through D models. It is 25% larger than the previous airframe, but with 
46% fewer parts (Boeing webpage, 2001). The increased size allows for greater fuel 
capacity, extending its mission radius by up to 40%. The Super Hornet has entered full- 
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rate production through a multi-year contract that will result in a minimum purchase of 
548 aircraft in 2010 (Boeing webpage, 2001). 
2.        Major General Snider and the RAH-66 Comanche Program 
MG Snider was advanced to the rank of Brigadier General when he was assigned 
the responsibilities of the Comanche PM in August of 1994. While still in the Program 
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase, MG Snider entered the program as the 
Secretary of Defense cancelled its production funding, reducing it to an industrial and 
technology-based program. He served as the Comanche PM until June 1997. 
The RAH-66, known as the Comanche, is the planned replacement to the OH-58, 
OH-6, OH-58D and AH-1 helicopters and is the Army's number one priority program. It 
will be incorporated into the Army's air cavalry and reconnaissance units, and as a scout 
for the AH-64 Apache it will be incorporated into heavy division and corps attack 
helicopter battalions. It features a crash-worthy and ballistically tolerant airframe; 
significantly reduced radar cross-section derived from the fuselage shape and internally 
carried weapons; and, the capability to recognize and identify targets and digitally 
transmit the information to battlefield commanders in near real-time (Galindo, 2000). 
3.        Brigadier General Feigley and the AAAV Program 
BGEN Feigley's joined the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
program in 1988 as the Assistant Program Manager, while he held the rank of Major. He 
remained with the program for the better part often years, ending his stint in 1998 at the 
rank of Colonel, having been the PM since 1994. The program was designated a Direct 
Reporting Program in 1993, placing the program directly under the Defense Acquisition 
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Executive (DAE), the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD 
(A&T)). The AAAV program has received two Packard Awards, an Innovative 
Technology Award, two Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) Awards and three 
Meritorious Unit Commendations. 
The AAAV is closely tied to the signature mission of the Marine Corps. It is 
designed to provide over-the-horizon maneuver capability for a combat-loaded Marine 
infantry squad at 20-25 knots in the water and the same speed and agility of the M-l tank 
over land. It features an NBC over-pressure system, modular armor, and a 30mm turret 
gun with growth capabilities to 40mm. Its engineering design has been largely 
influenced by total ownership cost (TOC) principles. It replaces the aging fleet of 
Assault Amphibian Vehicles. The Marine Corps plans to purchase a little over 1000 
AAAVs by 2012 (DoD webpage, 2001b). 
4. Rear Admiral Johnston and the JSOW Program 
From August 1996 to April 1999, RADM Johnston was assigned as the PM for 
the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). He held the rank of Captain during his tenure with 
the JSOW program. The program includes three variants of the weapon. Each variant 
was in different acquisition stages while RADM Johnston was PM. The JSOW program 
received the Daedalian's Weapon System Award and the Defense Acquisition Executive 
Certificate of Achievement. 
JSOW is considered a family of air-to-surface glide weapons in the 1000-lb range. 
Its design makes it kinematically efficient, providing standoff capabilities from high and 
low altitudes. JSOW can be used against both land and sea targets, but operates outside 
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of enemy point defenses giving the warfighter what is described as "standoff precision 
engagement" capabilities (OSD webpage, 2001a). This is accomplished through the use 
of Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS) coupling. The 
weapon was designed to be delivered from the F/A-18 E/F, so it too is day/night and all 
weather capable. The three variants differ by the type of warhead that is attached to the 
weapon and the precision of the guidance system. It can be employed via Navy, Marine 
and Air Force aircraft (OSD webpage, 2001a). 
5.        Colonel Matthews and the ATACMS Program 
In April of 1990 COL Matthews joined the Army Tactical Missile System 
(ATACMS) program as the PM. He led the program until April of 1994. During his 
tenure the program successfully completed two milestone reviews and was successfully 
deployed during Desert Storm while still in a limited production status. COL Matthews 
was awarded the honor of Army Program Manager of the Year for 1991. 
ATACMS is a long-range, supersonic, surface-to-surface, guided missile. It is 
fired from the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). It engages targets deep in the 
Joint Force Commander's Area of Responsibility (AOR). The missile accurately delivers 
an anti-personnel/anti-materiel warhead with multiple fragmentation bomblets. The 
program consists of different evolutionary "blocks". Each progressive block improves 
the accuracy and the range of the missile. This is accomplished through a GPS guidance 
system for in-flight position updates and a reduced, but more effective, payload of 
Brilliant Anti-armor Technology (BAT) sub-munitions (U. S. Army webpage, 2001). 
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C.       INTERVIEW SUMMARIES 
1.        Vice Admiral Dyer and the Competency Aligned Organization 
Innovation 
VADM Dyer's innovation was a new way to manage defense acquisition 
programs. The innovation was called the Competency Aligned Organization. His 
innovation created a team-based organization that integrated functional experts involved 
in the program. Team members were now administratively and physically collocated 
under the leadership of the PM. Beginning in June 1995 the F/A-18 Strike Fighter 
program consolidated full life cycle responsibility for the acquisition of naval aircraft and 
associated weapons systems in the individual program manager 
The idea originated from a study group in 1992-1993, involving VADM Dyer 
(then Capt Dyer) and approximately eight other Navy acquisition professionals. The 
concept was to create a team from the functional areas of the matrix support 
establishment and assign the team to the program manager so he could have full control 
over his program's cost, schedule, and performance objectives. 
VADM Dyer described the old way PMs managed their programs. The PM had to 
"hire" specialists from the organizational matrix much the same way a general contractor 
builds a house. If something went wrong in a specific area of the program it was usually 
the responsibility of the specialists in that area to fix it, i.e., if something was wrong in 
the engineering aspect of the program the engineer department in the matrix had to fix it. 
The PM shared in the blame for the delay caused by the problem. The PM had to go up 
through the command chain several levels to involve senior leadership in resolving the 
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conflict. This innovation provided both the integrated approach needed to successfully 
field complex weapon systems, and the program manager the control he needed to be 
responsible for the task. 
2.        Major General Snider and the Program Redesign Innovation 
MG Snider began his job as the Comanche PM with a need to innovate. Just 
before his assignment, the Comanche program lost two billion dollars of funding- 
relegating it to an industrial technology-based program status to preserve the technology. 
His innovation used a team approach to brainstorm program redesign options to create a 
new program timeline and funding schedule. His innovation also featured a new 
partnership agreement with the contractor that shortened the delivery time of two 
prototype aircraft. The consequence of the innovation was the restoration of two billion 
dollars to the Comanche Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Delivering the 
prototype flying aircraft early simulated the interests of the user, and demonstrated to 
program critics the program's technology risks were manageable. 
This innovation is interesting because the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) cut the program but Army maintained it was a high acquisition priority. MG 
Snider was faced with finding a tactful, political way of changing the Comanche program 
in the eyes of OSD to gain back the funding loss of two billion dollars. As a result of the 
redesign he led, the program received all of its initial funding in FY1995 and a $100 
million plus up in FY1996. 
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3. Brigadier General Feigley and the Collocation Innovation 
BGen Feigley is credited with creating the first Government-contractor collocated 
program office for a MDAP. The idea surfaced during the Concept Exploration phase, 
prior to the award of the phase I contract. Collocation of the management offices was 
actually stipulated in the Request for Proposal (RFP), so it would be a requirement for the 
winning offeror. The idea was also related to the IPPD concept. BGen Feigley believed 
collocation was needed to make the IPPD process work. 
The idea was to create an industry-Government partnership to share Government 
knowledge of an AAAV-like system. He described "sociological perspective" achieved 
through collocation by sharing information face-to-face. It had to be more than just a 
sharing of data and reports. The best way to do this was also collocation. 
4. Rear Admiral Johnston and the Missile Warranty Innovation 
RDML Johnston's innovation was to include in the JSOW contract a warranty for 
every JSOW unit purchased by the Navy. This required a shift in the maintenance 
responsibility from the Navy to the contractor. The contractor would become more 
concerned about the actual reliability of the system, since they would bear the added cost 
of maintenance if the actual reliability dropped below the contractor's advertised 
reliability. 
His innovation would make the manufacturer responsible for the performance of 
the weapons system for the life of the system. The contractor would be responsible not 
only to identify and correct latent defects ten or twenty years into the lifecycle, but also to 
retrofit the existing inventory with the reliability upgrade. The contractor was not 
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comfortable with the unlimited liability introduced by the warranty so RDML Johnston's 
team proposed a cap to reduce the contractor's liability in the event the missile 
experienced unforeseen catastrophic problems. The cap was set at $50 million. 
RDML Johnston succeeded in innovating by showing how the warranty would be 
cost effective (pay for itself) within a few years. He demonstrated to decision-makers 
how the warranty cost (1.5% of the unit cost) could influence contractor behavior and 
save money in the future, through production of a higher quality weapon system. 
5.        Colonel Matthews and the Blanket Travel Orders Innovation 
COL Matthews became frustrated with constant administrative burden of 
providing orders for the members of his program team. With over 100 Government 
employees on his program, 10-20 employees were on travel at any one time. Travel 
requirements often arose with little notice, due to the nature of the ATACMS program. 
Short fused travel requests required enormous effort, from both program secretaries and 
travelers, to ensure the necessary travel arrangements were made. 
COL Matthews happened to read an article in a Government R&D magazine that 
described a TQL initiative used by another acquisition program to make travel easier. 
The process was called "blanket travel orders". Individuals were given travel orders that 
were valid for an entire fiscal year (FY). His idea was to use that same innovation in his 
program. He succeeded in creating "blanket travel orders" for personnel, GS-11 and 
above, in his program. Eventually all programs within his organization used blanket 
travel orders. 
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D.        SUBJECT RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1.        Vice Admiral Dyer's Responses to the Questionnaire 
Question 1.    Describe an innovation you made as a PMfrom "inception " to full 
implementation. 
Beginning in June 1995 the F/A-18 Strike Fighter program consolidated full life 
cycle responsibility for the acquisition of naval aircraft and associated weapons systems 
in the individual program manager. The concept was called the Competency Aligned 
Organization. In the case of the F/A-18, the program was divided into three integrated 
program teams, one for currently fielded F/A-18 C & D models, one for Foreign Military 
Sales and one for the new F-18 E/F upgrade. Each of the three integrated program teams 
is comprised of multiple integrated product teams, teams formed around a specific 
tangible product requested by the fleet. 
The idea began as a study group in 1992-1993, involving VADM Dyer (then 
CAPT Dyer) and approximately 8 other Navy acquisition professionals. The concept was 
to create a team from the functional areas of the matrix support establishment and assign 
the team to the program manager so he could have full control over his program's cost, 
schedule and performance objectives. 
VADM Dyer described the old way PMs managed their programs. The PM had to 
"hire" specialists from the organizational matrix much the same way a general contractor 
builds a house. If something went wrong in a specific area of the program it was usually 
the responsibility of the specialists in that area to fix it, i.e., if something was wrong in 
the engineering aspect of the program the engineer department in the matrix had to fix it. 
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The PM shared in the blame for the delay caused by the problem. The PM had to go up 
through the command chain several levels to involve senior leadership in resolving the 
conflict. This new idea provided both the integrated approach needed to successfully 
field complex weapon systems, and the program manager the control he needed to be 
responsible for the task. 
Question 2.     What were the pros and cons of the innovation ? 
He described the "pros" as: 
(a) closer to total, program and organizational optimization 
(b) ability to reach back quicker to functional expertise 
(c) creates a climate for integrated problem solving 
The "cons" were described as: 
(a) a change in the way of doing business will meet resistance 
(b) could carry the team idea too far--too much empowerment 
(c) group tendencies-like "going native"~could stifle good judgement 
(d) loss of control by leaders or functional groups 
(e) expertise is diluted, one individual from a functional group working and 
issue 
Question 3.     What were the attitudes of your seniors, peers and subordinates toward 
your innovation? How did they change over time? 
VADM Dyer's seniors were familiar with the origins of the innovation. He 
described the attitude of VADM Lockhard, the Commander of Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR), as cautious and supporting of the innovation in the Super Hornet 
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program as a prototype. His peers were described as apprehensive and showed some 
positive support. They too were held hostage by the old way of business (matrix 
support). He described his subordinates as "the most courageous of all". They supported 
the innovation even though they were torn between the team in the PM office and their 
old matrix office. 
Question 4.     Bid you have a formal or informal plan to achieve this innovation? If 
so, describe. How did the plan changeover time? 
Since the idea of teaming was intended for all of NAVAIR, the F-l 8 program 
office (PMA-265), as the largest NAVAIR program shop with over 1000 government 
employees across the US, was seen as the linchpin to achieving the innovation. If 
successful in PMA-265, within NAVAIR the "gravity would shift" in favor of the 
teaming concept. 
VADM Dyer knew this as the F-l8 E/F PM. He gave considerable thought to his 
choice of leaders to head the top tiers of teams within the office. His leadership choices 
were other Navy 0-6s and GM-15s. They were chosen to help manage the program and 
the innovation. 
VADM Dyer specifically mentioned retired Navy Captain, Jim Keen, who wrote 
a handbook with the tier leaders, which became the PM's specific operating guide. Mr. 
Keen had no other duties on the program except training the program staff to work in 
teams. 
The overall goal was to broadcast the change to the program office, communicate 
the new idea to the masses. When asked about strategies if the idea did not work VADM 
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Dyer stated that "off-ramps" were talked about but were not followed through due to 
idea's success. 
Opponents and proponents were identified during the idea's origination and in 
devising a plan for the implementation. 
Question 5.     Did you develop some sort of prototype for the innovation ? (e.g., 
computer program, pilot program, model) 
PMA-265 was the prototype for all of NAVAIR. Prior to implementing it in the 
F-18 PM office, only a conceptual model was elaborated. 
Question 6.     Who were the innovation 's proponents? 
VADM Dyer identified the innovation's proponents as the Commander of 
NAVAIR, VADM Lockhard; the Deputy COMNAVAIR, a civilian SES; for the most 
part the Engineering Matrix; and, the contractor leader for Boeing/Mac Air, Mike Sears. 
Question 7.     How did you use proponents to help you? 
He assisted VADM Lockhard in writing a letter to the command. It was sort of a 
policy letter, from the commander, directing the need to change the way of business, and 
acknowledged the fears associated with the change (what about the individual's ties back 
to matrix competencies). This letter "put heat on the dissenters" and created peer 
pressure to make the idea work on the leadership level above the PM (matrix leaders). 
Question 8.     Who were the innovation 's opponents? 
Legal, contracts, and logistics matrix organizations resisted the idea. 
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Question 9.    How did you handle opponents? 
He used proponents, who included senior leadership, to pressure "opponents to 
get on board"; for instance he drafted policy memo for release by VADM Lockhard 
(described in #7 above). 
Question 10.   Did the innovation work as anticipated? 
VADM Dyer stated the results of the program show that it did. In his own words 
it "was one of the most successful major defense programs", and was "on cost, on 
schedule and on performance". He felt others thought so too, since it received the first 
DoD Acquisition Excellence Award, and the Collier Award. 
Question 11.   Were compromises a part of getting the innovation accepted? 
Yes. He originally wanted IPT concept to extend down into the aviation depot 
community to cover all life cycles of the program. VADM Dyer admits he had to 
exclude the depots to get the idea through because changing the culture of the depot at the 
same time was too difficult. He believed it was the right compromise at the time. 
Question 12.   Where did the innovation originate? Was the innovation borrowed from 
another area or context? 
A group of eight or nine senior officers met in 1992 or 1993. The idea originated 
out of six months of group discussions focusing on the need to change the way of doing 
things because of changes in the environment, e.g., end of Cold War, downsizing. The 
old way was simply not working (cost and schedule overruns). The group saw a need to 
"fix the burning bridge". 
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Question 13.   Did you inherit any innovative ideas from the previous PM? If so were 
you able to achieve them? Why or why not? 
He inherited a good foundation to the program, e.g., good tools and a sound 
contract award structure. Had a number of "smart guys" to look at the program and offer 
advice. 
VADM Dyer stated that innovation comes from the marriage of both an idea and 
a person, this person needs a "streak of stubborn maverick". 
Question 14.   Did you leave any unfinished innovation attempts to your successor? 
Yes, bringing the IPT concept to the depot organizations. 
Question 15.   Do you consider yourself creative? An entrepreneur? 
He considers himself an "integrator", if this is creative, then yes. He believes that 
by Navy bureaucratic standards he is an entrepreneur. You create the perception of being 
an entrepreneur if you champion ideas that are "too new". 
Question 16.   What was the biggest barrier to achieving the innovation ? 
He described two barriers to his innovation: shifting of power and decision 
authority (from matrix to PM) and inertia of the status quo. 
Question 17.   How much time did you devote to the innovation ? 
Approximately half was spent on program management in general and half was 
devoted to the new idea throughout his tenure as PM. 
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2.        Major General Snider's Responses to the Questionnaire 
Question 1.    Describe an innovation you made as a PMfrom "inception " to full 
implementation. 
MG Snider described the redesign of the Comanche program. Two billion dollars 
were taken from the Comanche POM just prior to his assignment as PM. The program 
was placed in a hold status to preserve technology. He was given 3 months to restructure 
the program to "get back" the funding. The program cut moved IOC from 2003 to 2006. 
He stated, "A paper program is only worth the paper it is on". To win the money back, 
MG Snider, with his program team and contractor, proposed to field prototypes in 2001, 
earlier than originally planned before the funding cut. Having an actual flying aircraft 
would show appropriators the risk is reduced. He also stated, "Out year money is not as 
interesting as near year money, people are always willing to give you out-year money". 
This innovation is interesting because OSD cut the program but Army still wanted 
it. The PM was faced with finding a tactful, political way of changing the Comanche 
program in the eyes of OSD to gain back the funding loss of two billion dollars. The PM 
had the support of the Army Chief of Staff and other Army acquisition executives, but 
not the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
He allowed "marketing" by the contractor with the prototype. Tom Clancy 
conducted a book signing in May (during Congressional budget marks) at the Capitol. 
Clancy was a supporter of the Comanche. The program received all of its initial funding 
and a $100 million plus up in FY1996. MG Snider called it a "programmatic strategy 
innovation". Innovation was achieved in summer 1995 when program was put back into 
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full-scale status. Innovation took one year from start to full funding and $100 million 
plus up. 
Question 2.     What were the pros and cons of the innovation ? 
MG Snider described the "pros" of the innovation as: 
(a) operational community gets aircraft sooner, testing sooner, and 
integration of computer package would be there earlier. 
(b) low-observability characteristics of aircraft achieved earlier. 
(c) program's technological risk is reduced. 
The "cons" were described as: 
(a) high-risk strategy, puts more risk on contractor 
(b) contrary to OSD desires-going against the direction of higher. 
Question 3.     What were the attitudes of your seniors, peers and subordinates toward 
your innovation? How did they change over time? 
Gen Sullivan, The Army Chief of Staff, saw the need for Comanche early on. He 
called the Comanche the "quarterback of the Army". He even came to the Tom Clancy 
book signing and the first Comanche roll out. Another senior, the Army's Acquisition 
Executive, Mr Decker, was supportive and even helped derive some of the program 
acquisition strategy. From his peer group there was not a great deal of support, but high 
interest. They all had the same boss, so they had to fall in line, they had their own 
programs to worry about. Peers had a neutral effect on program during the innovation. 
His subordinates realized it would take a huge team effort to achieve the innovation and 
supported him. The contractor was the most difficult to sell the innovation to since they 
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were taking on more risk with a faster schedule at a fixed cost, but they had to do 
something to guarantee their "meal ticket". 
Question 4.    Did you have a formal or informal plan to achieve this innovation? If 
so, describe. How did the plan changeover time? 
MG Snider and his team had to show both the Army Chief of Staff and OSD that 
the program could shift "left" (move events up) and that the shift would lower the 
technical risk of the program. He felt the best way to get the money back was to get an 
actual flying prototype "in the hands" of the aviation community. 
He did not adjust strategy when the aircraft didn't fly when first scheduled Nov. 
30,1995. Jan. 6,1996 was actual first flight. 
He encountered problems with the strategy from the user, who wanted more on 
the aircraft, resulting in more testing. It was a strong user group, that had their own ideas 
and wanted to be in charge. The user was thinking "now that program is approved again, 
here are the additional things we need". They wanted compromises, which added risk. 
Question 5.    Did you develop some sort of prototype for the innovation ? (e.g., 
computer program, pilot program, model) 
The innovation was about getting a prototype of the Comanche out sooner. He 
gave a briefing of the new timeline, using computer-aided drawings to show the changes 
to the program and how much earlier in the schedule the flying prototypes would be 
available. He stated there was no room in budget for prototypes of his idea. 
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Question 6.     Who were the innovation'sproponents? 
He claimed as proponents the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
and the Army Chief of Staff, Gen Sullivan. 
Question 7.     How did you use the proponents to help you? 
Chief of Staff of the Army set priorities for Army acquisition programs; put 
Comanche first. Unplanned help by a proponent occurred in the DAB at the milestone 
review. OSD concerns about production funding surfaced. OSD felt there were too 
many programs competing for resources during the same period. The JCS J-8, speaking 
for the Vice JCS Chairman, addressed OSD production concerns and changed the course 
of the meeting. In effect he over-rode the OSD "no" vote. 
Question 8.     Who were the innovation 's opponents? 
At the DAB, OSD production folks said the program wouldn't work, it required 
too much money to make it, the slip in schedule would cost, and there were too many 
competing priorities (F-22, MV-22). They voted no at the DAB. 
Question 9.    How did you handle opponents? 
The opponents were dealt with by the proponents. Proponents supported the 
innovation (by supporting the program) without solicitation from PM. 
Question 10.   Did your innovation work as anticipated? 
Yes. 
Question 11.   Were compromises a part of getting the innovation accepted? 
Few compromises were made. The program conceded $100 million in funding 
but received it back later. 
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Question 12.   Where did the innovation originate? Was the innovation borrowed from 
another area or context? 
Brainstorming. He had three months to re-brief to DAB. He had to make 
substantial changes. PM, deputy, tech chief, and log chief were included in 
brainstorming effort. 
Question 13.   Did you inherit any innovative ideas from the previous PM? If so were 
you able to achieve them? Why or why not? 
Some, but difficult to enact due to program status. Some innovations that were 
contrary to the new direction of the program, based on his innovation, could not be 
implemented. Other smaller innovations (he described them as "internal" innovation) 
were attempted. 
Question 14.   Did you leave any unfinished innovation attempts to your successor? 
No. 
Question 15.   Do you consider yourself creative? An entrepreneur? 
He sometimes considers himself creative, but does not consider himself an 
entrepreneur. He brought new views to program, and could ask the hard questions. 
When a new PM comes in every 3-4 years, he can ask dumb questions, which stimulates 
new thought and innovations. 
Question 16.   What was the biggest barrier to achieving the innovation ? 
Competing interests and decisions on a consensus basis were listed as the biggest 
barriers to his innovation. You need big players on board to succeed but there are too 
many other programs and priorities to make success a given. 
41 
Question 17.   How much time did you devote to the innovation ? 
He took a full month to create a strategy/plan for the innovation, and to talk to 
Army acquisition executives (over Christmas holiday). He focused on the details after 
base plan was set. 
3.        Brigadier General Feigley's Responses to the Questionnaire 
Question 1.    Describe an innovation you made as a PMfrom "inception " to full 
implementation. 
BGen Feigley is credited with creating the first government-contractor collocated 
program office for a MDAP. The idea surfaced during the Concept Exploration phase, 
prior to the award of the phase I contract. Collocation of the management offices was 
actually stipulated in the RFP, so it would be a requirement for the winning offerer. The 
idea was also related to the IPPD concept. BGen Feigley believed collocation was 
needed to make the IPPD process work. 
In his words, the jump from the current system (AAV) to the AAAV was similar 
to what happened in aviation-propeller to jet-like transformation. He also calls the 
AAAV "a track laying aircraft". 
The idea was to create an industry-Government partnership to share Government 
knowledge of an AAAV-like system. He described a "sociological perspective" achieved 
through collocation to share information. What was needed was more than just a sharing 
of data and reports. BGen Feigley knew he had to try something different to get the 
results that he wanted. He started from the premise that to be successful the Government 
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and contractor teams would have to share much of the same information and develop the 
same "social perspective". The best way to do this was collocation. 
Question 2.     What were the pros and cons of the innovation ? 
The "pros" were articulated as: 
(a) creation of a "sociological perspective" for the contractor 
(b) better developed professional trust and confidence between the two 
teams 
(c) more effective IPPD 
(d) speed—decreased turnaround time 
The "cons" of the innovation were articulated as: 
(a) legal issues, maintaining "arms-length integrity" 
(b) harder to keep some information separate (certain information that was 
required to be separate)s 
(c) speed—hard to maintain proper control with decreased turnaround time 
Question 3.     What were the attitudes of your seniors, peers and subordinates toward 
your innovation? How did they change over time? 
He didn't ask for his superiors' permission. Originally his seniors were surprised. 
He responded, "How is my idea contrary to what you want?" He showed them how his 
idea was in line with acquisition reform and policy goals. He convinced superiors that 
the idea would work. As the idea proved successful, seniors' support became more 
vocal. 
43 
Because BGen Feigley was a Direct Reporting Program Manager, his peers were 
not an issue with the idea. His contractor counter-part would have to support the idea 
because it was in the RFP. 
Originally, subordinates were worried. BGen Feigley devoted time to explain 
"why" and educate the PM office, changing the worried attitude to one of understanding 
and support. Then he asked for their help in forming a strategy to address how they 
would make collocation work. 
Question 4.    Did you have a formal or informal plan to achieve this innovation ? If 
so, describe. How did the plan changeover time? 
His strategy focused on "how" to get the idea accepted, not "if the idea is 
accepted. He conducted experimenting within his mind to test the theories of the 
innovation. It was critical for the government to transfer all it knew about amphibious 
vehicles to the contractor. 
He stated, "part of innovation is having a great deal of autonomy." His decision 
to collocate the program office was made unilaterally. He made the decision, then after 
the contract was awarded he notified his seniors of his innovation. Sort of a "seek 
forgiveness" rather than "ask permission" strategy. 
Part of his strategy to accomplish the innovation included study of the past. He 
emphasized the importance of knowing history to avoid past pitfalls (studied Polaris and 
Posidon programs) and to establish baselines. To avoid falling in the "same old rut", he 
advises looking at other commodity lines (e.g., tanks, airplanes submarines, etc.). 
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He developed a theoretical plan for collocation in the RFP, but realized the plan 
needed continuous leadership effort. 
BGen Feigley discussed strategy for what he called the theoretical part of the idea, 
and strategy for implementing the idea. Strategy for actual implementing included 
convincing proponents that the ethical issues could be resolved and changing the cultural 
views of the subordinates in the PM office. 
He expressed his belief that there is no cookbook for innovation; you can't follow 
a set of rules or steps with an idea and get innovation on the other end. 
Question 5.    Did you develop some sort of prototype for the innovation ? (e.g., 
computer program, pilot program, model) 
No, it was all or nothing. 
Question 6.     Who were the innovation 's proponents? 
BGen Feigley believed that in theory he had both the pentagon and OSD (AT&L) 
on his side. Both were professing the need to reform acquisitions, he felt they would 
support his idea. He gained proponents as time passed. 
Question 7.     How did you use proponents to help you? 
Proponents were watching the idea; they wanted to see how it would work to 
achieve acquisition reform goals. 
Question 8.     Who were the innovation 's opponents? 
The legal and comptroller functional areas associated with his program were 
opposed to the idea. Acquisition "watch dog" groups were also concerned. 
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Question 9.    How did you handle opponents? 
He had an open door policy at the facility. He invited opponents to come and see 
for themselves that nothing improper was taking place. "See anything you want, attend 
any meeting you want. And, if you do find anything, thank you, we'll fix it." 
He understood that even the best ideas meet opposition. He wanted to lead the 
opposition into believing that his idea would work. 
Question 10.  Did the innovation work as anticipated? 
Yes and no. Programs are not linear. Phases and stages of activities occur within 
programs. IPPD process had to weather adversity to test the strength of the innovation. 
For the most part the IPPD concept survived during critical moments with in the 
program. Younger program personnel were more accepting of the collocation and IPPD 
process than the older personnel were. 
Question 11.   Were compromises a part of getting the innovation accepted? 
BGen Feigley said he did not compromise on the "if1 it would happen, but he did 
on the "how" it would happen. He included the program team in the "how" decisions. 
He used his team to build the strategy to implement the idea. 
BGen Feigley believes the 2 biggest reasons innovations fail are lack of integrated 
approach and lack of concern for people affected by the innovation. 
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Question 12.   Where did the innovation originate? Was the innovation borrowed from 
another area or context? 
BGen Feigley conceived the idea as a part of the acquisition strategy for the 
program going into the PDRR phase. He studied acquisition history to determine what 
worked best in past successful programs. 
Question 13.   Did you inherit any innovative ideas from the previous PM? If so were 
you able to achieve them? Why or why not? 
N/A, technically there is no PM during Concept Exploration. 
Question 14.   Did you leave any unfinished innovation attempts to your 
Yes, lots. In the areas of logistical design engineering. 
Question 15.   Do you consider yourself creative? An entrepreneur? 
Doesn't really consider himself creative. It just appears that way. Thinks 
logically in a systematic way. He considers himself an entrepreneur, described it as part 
of his style. "I am always looking for something better." 
He also said, "You can't under-estimate the value of persistence in innovation." 
He placed more importance on persistence 
Question16.   What was the biggest barrier to achieving the innovation? 
He described the uncertainty of the idea; he couldn't prototype it, so it can only go 
from your mind to actually doing it. He doesn't consider this a barrier; rather, he sees it 
as a burden. Due to nature of DRPM, he did not experience any bureaucratic barriers. 
He did list inertia of the status quo and initial cultural barriers to Govt/contractor daily 
integration, in the first months, as barriers. 
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Question 17.   How much time did you devote to the innovation ? 
He said that as a PM he is constantly thinking about improvements to his 
program. When pressed to describe it quantitatively he estimated that 5-10% of his time 
as PM is spent on the execution of the innovation. While people on AAAV team were 
focused on implementing the collocation idea, he was already thinking about the next 
idea that would improve his program. 
4.        Rear Admiral Johnston's Responses to the Questionnaire 
Question 1.    Describe an innovation you made as a PMfrom "inception " to full 
implementation. 
RDML Johnston's idea was to include in the JSOW contract a warranty for every 
JSOW unit purchased by the Navy. The original estimates for the warranty were 
approximately 6% of the unit cost. His innovation garnered a warranty for 1.5% of the 
unit cost. 
His idea required a shift in the maintenance responsibility from the Navy to the 
contractor. The contractor would become more concerned about the actual reliability of 
the system, since they would bear the added cost of maintenance if the actual reliability is 
less than they advertised. 
His idea would make the manufacturer responsible for the performance of the 
weapons system for the life of the system. The contractor would be responsible not only 
to identify and correct latent defects ten or twenty years into the lifecycle, but also to 
retrofit the existing inventory with the reliability upgrade. 
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Both parties estimated 2 major redesign retrofits in the missile's life. Contractor 
was not originally convinced that they could provide the warranty for the price the 
government was willing to pay (1.5%). The PM shop proposed a cap to reduce the 
contractor's liability in the event the missile experienced unforeseen catastrophic 
problems that would cause the contractor to go bankrupt. The cap was set at $50 million. 
The idea was to drive design behavior of the contractor to produce a missile with 
higher reliability. He showed how the warranty would be cost effective (pay for itself) 
within a few years. He used warranty money (1.5% of the unit cost) to influence the 
contractor behavior and save money in the future, through production of a higher quality 
weapon system. 
Question 2.     WJiat were the pros and cons of the innovation ? 
The "pros" of the innovation were identified as: 
(a) incentivize the contractor to manage the system's life-cycle 
configuration 
(b) better product, with better long-term reliability 
(c) shrink Government systems engineering staff in the future. 
The "cons" were identified as: 
(a) higher cost (but pays for itself in the long run) 
(b) cap on warranty liability ($50 million) meant that the Government 
assumed the risk of exceeding the cap. 
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Question 3.     What were the attitudes of your seniors, peers and subordinates toward 
your innovation? How did they change over time? 
RADM Cook, his Program Executive Officer (PEO), gave his full support, liked 
the new idea, and empowered RDML Johnston. DAB and pre-DAB committees 
understood the complexities of the innovation. Generally, his peers were supportive, but 
apprehensive in the beginning because of competition for scarce funding dollars. They 
vocalized issues of concern to PM. His contractor peers didn't want to "bet the farm" on 
the idea. Through consensus, the idea gained support. His subordinates were supportive 
of the idea, and believed it was the "right thing to do". 
Question 4.     Did you have a formal or informal plan to achieve this innovation ? If 
so, describe. How did the plan changeover time? 
RDML Johnston described several aspects of what he described as an informal 
strategy: 
(a) an early "socialization" of the idea. In other words, the idea was 
discussed openly with those involved to test the reaction to it and to 
get people thinking about it. 
(b) need for subordinates support of the idea was paramount. Used a 
strategy of communication to get subordinates on board. 
The only formal part of the plan included developing a briefing schedule to 
convince those in DoD with the power to stop the idea that the idea was the right thing to 
dofortheJSOW. 
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He offered that the following are general strategies for any innovation: 
(a) avoid adversarial relationships 
(b) communicate often, discussion is good 
(c) develop a good network 
(d) treat every question as an opportunity to improve your idea 
RDML Johnston stated that the warranty innovation was a natural evolution of the 
right thing to do in the program, it was not a flash of brilliance. 
Question 5.    Did you develop some sort of prototype for the innovation ? (e.g., 
computer program, pilot program, model) 
To demonstrate proof of the concept and help predict contractor costs (reduce 
risk), a computer simulation model for maintenance costs was developed. Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques were employed for both re-design and retro-fit maintenance 
programs. 75-80% confidence intervals were chosen. These prototype models were used 
to predict the cost effectiveness of the idea for both the contractor and Government sides. 
Question 6.     Who were the innovation 's proponents? 
In the early stages of the innovation RDML Johnston described the role of his 
program office not a proponents but as investigators. Once they were convinced of its 
merits they became proponents. RADM Cook, his PEO, was an early proponent. 
Proponents within the Navy acquisition structure were won over and became supportive 
as the idea evolved. 
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Question 7.    How did you use proponents to help you? 
RDML Johnston, as the PM, "armed" his PEO, RADM Cook, with 4-5 "sound 
bytes" (key benefits of the warranty that addressed concerns/issues of the opposition). 
He used proponents in a continual effort to grow support for the idea. He couldn't 
get the idea approved at one sit-down meeting. He needed to "spread the idea like a 
virus". 
Question 8.     Who were the innovation's opponents? 
OSD didn't believe the warranty was value added. OSD believed the Government 
is its own best insurer. The contractor was reluctant to sign up to the innovation because 
they didn't have a good grasp of how much risk they assumed for the warranty payment. 
Within the company the engineering function was at odds with the management function 
over the true nature of the risk. 
Question 9.     How did you handle opponents? 
He described his approach to opponents as "straight up". He didn't go around 
them or through them, but used their criticisms to make his idea better. Addressing their 
concerns won them over and made the idea better, making it easier to win others over. 
Question 10.   Did the innovation work as anticipated? 
RDML Johnston believes the idea worked like it should, but acknowledged that, 
because the idea deals primarily with long term reliability of the JSOW weapon system, it 
is to early to tell. He stated, "the weapon has been dropped 65 times in combat and 65 
times it has gone where it was supposed to go". 
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Question 11.   Were compromises apart of getting the innovation accepted? 
Yes. He had to modify the idea to include cost caps for the contractor to reduce 
risk and get contractor to approve. The contractor had to approve the innovation through 
a change to the existing contract. 
To get DoD approval, he had to downsize Government system engineering 
support for the JSOW in the out years and show how doing so factored into the total cost 
of the system. 
Question 12.   Where did the innovation originate? Was the innovation borrowed from 
another area or context? 
Those in the PM shop had always believed that a new weapon ought to have a 
warranty, just like a new car. The idea was floated around the PM shop; it may have 
been from a previous PM. 
Question 13.   Did you inherit any innovative ideas from the previous PM? If so were 
you able to achieve them? Why or why not? 
The origins for the warranty were inherited through the program office personnel. 
RDML Johnston stated he believed innovation was "about 70% dependent upon the 
individual and 30% on the idea". He has seen very few bad ideas but a lot of bad 
implementation. 
Question 14.   Did you leave any unfinished innovation attempts to your successor? 
No, don't recall any. 
He believes most ideas begin 1-2 years after a PM comes into the program. Takes 
about a year to get your feet on the ground and you're excited about it (the program). 
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You see something that you want to achieve during your time and you work to achieve, 
toward the end you are looking to tie up all the loose ends. 
Question 15.   Do you consider yourself creative? An entrepreneur? 
Yes to both. Considers himself creative, enjoys it. Enjoys translating, selling, 
and discussing. 
Question 16.   What was the biggest barrier to achieving the innovation? 
The biggest barriers to his innovation were technical barriers relating to the actual 
idea (shifting liability to the contractor) and too many people have the power to say "no". 
The latter complicates the communications aspect. 
Question 17.   How much time did you devote to the innovation ? 
For approximately 6 months of his time as PM the idea consumed about 10% of 
his and his team's effort. 
5.        Colonel Matthews' Responses to the Questionnaire 
Question 1.    Describe an innovation you made as a PMfrom "inception " to full 
implementation. 
COL Matthews described a "blanket travel orders" innovation to improve the 
travel orders process within his program. Travel orders were a significant administrative 
burden; 10-20 people in his program were always on travel (100 people in the program 
office). Due to the nature of his program, short notice travel happened frequently, 
exacerbating the already cumbersome process. The current administrative process was 
complex, time consuming, counter-productive. He learned about a Total Quality 
Management (TQM) travel initiative, through an R&D magazine, called "blanket travel". 
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The agency invented it by putting GS-13 and above personnel on travel orders for one 
foil F Y. Travel was authorized only in the 48 contiguous states. Orders were kept on file 
at SATO office. 
After he implemented blanket travel orders the administration process for travel 
orders was reduced from a foil day to several minutes. To get his idea approved, COL 
Matthews had to show there were reasonable mechanisms in place to detect/prevent fraud 
waste and abuse. He received approval for GS-14's and above for a three-month period 
as a pilot program, then won approval for GS-13's. Later, he unilaterally lowered it to 
GS-11 's with history of frequent travel. He did not seek permission from his superiors as 
he was the highest reviewer for those travel orders. In his words, "forgiveness was easier 
to obtain than permission". 
Question 2.     What were the pros and cons of the innovation ? 
He listed the innovation's "pros as: 
(a) efficiency 
(b) improved employee morale 
The "cons" were listed as: 
(a) potential for abuse 
(b) hard for comptrollers to keep track of obligations 
Question 3.     What were the attitudes of your seniors, peers and subordinates toward 
your innovation? How did they change over time? 
His seniors were originally opposed to idea, thought it was incompatible with 
being a steward of Government funds. They had to be convinced that fraud could be 
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detected. His peers included the Deputy PEO, a COL, who was against the idea at first 
due to fraud concerns. COL Matthews stated that the deputy PEO was sort of peer and 
superior. Other PM's were happy to see the system changed, and realized they would 
reap the benefits of the innovation. His subordinates, both the travelers and secretaries in 
his program, were thrilled. They were supportive of the idea because it reduced workload 
and hassle for them. 
Question 4.    Did you have a formal or informal plan to achieve this innovation ? If 
so, describe. How did the plan changeover time? 
COL Matthews' plan focused on "how do we overcome bureaucratic opposition to 
an idea" that was "too smart", it made too much sense. He knew there would be 
opposition from comptrollers and superiors concerned about fraud. He knew that the 
relaxing of the existing inefficient travel procedures would take some selling. After 
communicating the idea to concerned parties, he modified his strategy to address their 
critiques. He had to create an acceptable notification system for the comptrollers. As it 
turned out, email was the best way to notify "bean counters" with estimates. Email was 
also chosen as the means to notify concerned parties of non-routine travel justifications. 
He stated that he had separate strategies to deal with superiors and functional area parts 
of the organization, e.g., legal and comptroller. To convince his superiors that the idea 
would work, he had to walk the new system through the fraud oversight mechanism, after 
the first trip, to demonstrate that committing fraud under the new system was not easier 
than the old system. 
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COL Matthews did not originally plan for a pilot program. It was a compromise, a 
change in strategy. COL Matthews wanted to go straight into the new procedures. When 
he sold the senior leadership that it was a good idea he couldn't convince them the 
oversight would be adequate without the pilot program. The idea would be re-evaluate 
with empirical data. COL Matthews sampled travel vouchers after the pilot program and 
determined that fraud could only happen with elaborate and complex schemes that could 
not be detected under the old system any way. This convinced his seniors that the new 
idea was as good as old way at detecting fraud, but was much more efficient and 
improved employee morale regarding travel. 
Question 5.    Did you develop some sort of prototype for the innovation ? (e.g., 
computer program, pilot program, model) 
The prototype was a pilot program. It was a plan to allow GS-14s and above to 
use blanket travel for three months, to test the concept. It was not part of the original 
strategy. It was an ad hoc change to the strategy that ultimately resulted in the success of 
the innovation. 
Question 6.     Who were the idea's proponents? 
Originally, just himself and his program staff. Then he convinced the Deputy 
PEO to allow a pilot program. 
Question 7.    How did you use proponents to help you? 
Once he convinced the Deputy PEO and PEO, the other functional areas of the 
organization had to implement the innovation. 
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Question 8.     Who were the innovation's opponents? 
As described above, his PEO and Deputy PEO were originally against the idea. 
The comptroller office was an opponent because they lost some control and still had 
responsibilities to show obligations and expenditures. They're chief complaint about the 
idea was "how would we still have a handle on the dollars?" 
Question 9.    How did you handle opponents? 
COL Matthews planned in the strategy to win over his PEO with the merits of the 
idea so other opposition (comptrollers) would be directed to comply with the new 
process. He wanted to shift the gravity in their favor. 
Question 10.   Did the innovation work as anticipated? 
Yes 
Question 11.   Were compromises a part of getting the innovation accepted? 
Yes, the pilot program was compromise. It delayed implementation but increased 
odds of favorable implementation. He also had to devise a way to notify the comptroller 
office of estimated and actual travel expenditures so they could track his program's 
spending. 
Question 12.   Where did the innovation originate? Was the innovation borrowed from 
another area or context? 
He learned of the idea from an article in a Government R&D magazine-he 
doesn't recall which one. The article described a TQL initiative that was successful in 
another acquisition organization, he thinks it was a space and missile defense program. 
After he read about it he realized blanket travel could solve a lot of his travel 
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administration problems. He didn't think that it would be hard to implement the idea 
because there was already a precedent. 
Question 13.   Did you inherit any innovative ideas from the previous PM? If so were 
you able to achieve them? Why or why not? 
No, none. 
Question 14.   Did you leave any unfinished innovation attempts to your successor? 
Yes, an idea about the accuracy of missile (medium range error was greater than 
at max range). The program office established a working group to find a solution. They 
found an incorrect range/bomb dispersal algorithm at medium range. 
Question 15.   Do you consider yourself creative? An entrepreneur? 
He considers himself more creative than the average PM, but not at top of list. He 
considers himself an entrepreneur. He stated, "I'm a pretty good salesman" and "I'm 
flexible and a good communicator. I don't give 'how', I just give 'what'." 
Question 16.   What was the biggest barrier to achieving the innovation ? 
The biggest barriers he encountered were bureaucratic inertia and people are risk 
adverse, they are comfortable with the status quo. 
Question 17.   How much time did you devote to the innovation ? 
He devoted a couple of hours in a couple of weeks to implementing the idea. 
E.        CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Five former MDAP PMs described their experiences managing innovation within 
their programs. The PMs represented programs from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps 
in the areas of aviation, missiles and air defense, and amphibious vehicles. Each former 
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PM discussed characteristics of a single innovation they achieved or helped achieve. 
Their responses focused on the innovation, persons involved with the innovation, 
strategies, and barriers to achieving the innovation. 
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V.       ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the analysis of the data contained in the interview 
responses of the five PMs. First, the classification scheme used to order the data is 
discussed and justification for the categories and classifications is provided. Points of 
convergence and divergence in the data are then discussed and analyzed. This systematic 
analysis provides the basis for the identification of themes in managing innovation in 
acquisition programs. 
B. CLASSIFYING INTERVIEW DATA 
Analysis of the interview responses will be conducted according to a 
classification scheme as an aid to both the research and the reader. I attempted to 
organize the interview responses in relation to the secondary research questions of this 
thesis. In general, the secondary research questions pertain to four categories: (1) the 
public entrepreneur, (2) the idea/innovation, (3) strategies, and (4) barriers. Therefore, I 
have chosen to classify the interview responses in those four categories. 
1. Public Entrepreneur 
The public entrepreneur category of the classification scheme contains of 
information specific to the entrepreneur(s) associated with the idea/innovation. The 
category includes: 
(a) Group or individual. If other peers or superiors helped implement the idea, it 
is considered group entrepreneurship. If the PM alone championed the 
innovative idea, it is considered individual entrepreneurship. 
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(b) Creative/Entrepreneur. The PM's self report regarding creativity and 
entrepreneurship. PMs directly answered this question in the interview. 
(c) Time spent on idea. The amount of time he devoted to implementing the idea. 
This is expressed in terms of hours per week or percentage of time while 
implementing the idea. 
(d) Idea vs. Entrepreneur. The importance of the new idea vs. the entrepreneur. 
This is a determination whether the PM believes the merit of the innovative 
idea is more important in achieving innovation or the entrepreneur. 
(e) Inherited/left ideas. PM stated whether he inherited ideas from the previous 
PM or left any ideas to his successor. 
(f) How long a PM. Estimate of how long the PM was in the program before he 
attempted the innovation. 
Figure 6 depicts the public entrepreneur category classification. 
Category 
1. Public Entrepreneur 
a. Group or individual 
b. Creative/Entrepreneur 
c. Time spent on idea 
d. Significance of idea vs. 
entrepreneur 
e. Inherited/ left ideas 
f How long in job 
PM Response 
Group or individual 
(yes or no) / (yes or no)  
Time stated as a percentage or actual time 
Idea or individual(s) 
(yes or no) / (yes or no) 
Start, mid or end 
Figure 6. Public Entrepreneur Category 
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2. Innovation 
The idea/innovation category contains typology associated with the definition of 
innovation used in this thesis, "successful introduction into an applied situation of a 
means or ends that are new to that situation" (Mohr, 1969, pi 12). From the definition, 
innovations can be classified as a new "means" or an "ends". New "means" equates to 
process innovation, while new "ends" equates to product innovation. An innovation can 
be both a product and a process. An idea that is "new to the situation" includes origins 
that can be classified as borrowed, modified or new (Roberts and King, 1996). A 
borrowed idea is one that is taken from another situation and used unchanged in a new 
situation. A modified idea is also taken from another situation, but it is tailored or 
changed to meet the conditions of the new situation. 
Also, in the idea/innovation category are details including: the acquisition phase 
in the program when the innovation occurred, and whether the idea originated internal or 
external to the program office. An idea will be classified as internal if its originator(s) 
belonged to the program office at the idea's inception, or external if not associated with 
the program at the idea's inception. Figure 7 depicts the idea/innovation category 
classification. 
Category PM Response 
2. Innovation 
a. Product or Process Product, process or both 
b. Origination Borrowed, modified or new 
c. Originator(s) Internal or external to the program 
d. Phase in program CE, PDRR, EMD, PF/D&OS 
e. Compromises Yes or no 
Figure 7. Innovation Category 
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3.        Barriers 
This category of the classification scheme lists the barriers encountered by the PM 
while trying to achieve innovation. Figure 8 depicts the barrier(s) category classification. 
Category 
4. Barriers 
a.  Types of barriers 
PM Response 
List of barriers 
Figure 8. Barrier Category 
4.        Strategy 
The strategy category of the classification scheme relates PM responses to these 
sub-categories: 
(a) Description of strategy. Here I provide a short title of the strategy or 
strategies employed by the PM to implement the idea. 
(b) Formal or informal. Classification of the strategy as formal or informal. 
Formal strategy equates to a planned and systematic innovation attempt 
(Roberts, 1999), while informal equates to innovation through "groping   . 
along" (Behn, 1988; Golden, 1990). 
(c) Changes to strategy. Indicates whether the PM made any changes to his 
strategy as the idea evolved. 
(d) Compromises. This section identifies whether the PM had to compromise on 
his idea to achieve innovation. 
(e) Use of prototype. Yes/no indication whether the PM used a prototype of the 
idea as part of his innovation strategy. 
64 
(f) Barrier(s) influence strategy. Yes/no indication as to whether or not the PM 
formed a strategy with innovation barrier(s) in mind. 
Figure 9 depicts the strategy category classification. 
Category 
3. Strategy 
a. Description of strategy 
b. Formal or informal 
c. Changes to Strategy 
d. Use of prototype 
e. Barrier (s) influence strategy 
PM Response 
Short title of strategy or strategies employed by 
PM 
Formal or informal 
Yes or no 
Yes or no 
Yes or no 
Figure 9. Strategy Category 
C. CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY 
The responses from each interview subject were classified according to the 
scheme described above. In two instances a subject's response to a particular question 
was implicit or unclear. In these instances an assumption was made that best represented 
the answer. Assumptions are annotated within the table and described in the notes at the 
bottom of the table. A categorized summary of the interview subjects' responses is 














a. Collective or 
individual 
Collective Collective Individual Individual Individual 
b. Creative/ 
Entrepreneur 
Yes'/Yes Yes/No No/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 





10% for 6 
months 
Couple of hours 
per week for 
several weeks d. Significance of idea 
vs. entrepreneur 
Entrepreneur Entrepreneur^ Entrepreneur Entrepreneur Entrepreneur 
e. Inherited/ left ideas No/Yes Yes/No No/Yes Yes/No No/Yes f. How long a PM Start Start Start Start-mid Mid 
2. Idea/Innovation 
a. Product or Process Process Process Process Process Process b. Origination Modified Modified Modified Modified Borrowed 
c. Originator(s) Group Group Individual Group Individual d. Origin relative to 
program 
External Internal Internal Internal Internal 
e. Phase in program EMD* Late PDRR CE/PDRR EMD PF/DO&S j. Compromises Yes No Yes Yes Yes 3. Barriers 
a.  Types of barriers 

































































"permission" b. Formal or informal Formal Formal Informal Informal Informal 
c. Changes to Strategy Yes No Yes No Yes d. Use of prototype Yes° No No Yes Yes 
e. Barrier(s) influence 
strategy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Notes: 
1. Stated he is "an integrator, if that is creative then, yes". 
2. An assumption; stated a new PM is in a good position to champion ideas. Implies dormant ideas in the program 
need a new PM to become innovation. 
3. An assumption, described bureaucratic opposition to an idea that "made too much sense". Implies something 
more than a good idea is needed. 
4. F/A-18 E/F started in EMD phase as an upgrade to current F/A -18 A-D models. 
5. Allowed contractor to "sell" the idea to Congress and would-be supporters. 
6. The F/A-18 E/F program was the prototype for NAVAIR. 
Figure 10. Categorized Summary of Interview Subjects' Responses cont. 
D.        POINTS OF CONVERGENCE 
Comparing the responses in Figure 10 yields interesting similarities, or points of 
convergence. The similarities are addresses first by category, then across categories. 
1. Public Entrepreneur 
All interviewees saw themselves as either creative or an entrepreneur, or both. 
They all agreed explicitly or implicitly that the entrepreneur (individual) is the key 
ingredient in achieving innovation. 
2. Innovation 
Interestingly, not one PM described an innovation involving a new "end" or 
product. All five innovations are considered process innovations, since they resulted in a 
new "means". This is probably due to the fact that DoD PMs are responsible for 
navigating their program through the acquisition process, while the contractor is 
responsible for the actual design of the weapon system. I would expect to see the 
contractor PM achieve product innovations vice process innovations. All but one 
innovation originated from within the program itself. Four innovations were modified; 
the remaining innovation was borrowed. 
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3. Barriers 
Barrier themes expressed by the subjects included: inertia of status quo, the 
difficulty of achieving innovation when too many people in the approval process can say 
"no", and uncertainty or risk. Every PM identified multiple barriers to achieving their 
innovation. 
4. Strategies 
All the interview subjects devised strategies with multiple components. 
Communicating the merits of the innovation was a key component in three of the 
subject's innovation strategy. If you consider "marketing" or selling as a communication 
strategy, four PMs included the communication component in their strategies. Four PMs 
made compromises to their original idea to successfully implement it. All PMs 
articulated a linkage between their strategy and their barriers. Additionally, all PMs 
interviewed assessed both the innovation's pros and cons and key players who were for 
and against the innovation, before they formulated their strategy. 
5.        Intra-category 
Three of the four innovations that originated within the program had individual 
entrepreneurs. Both group entrepreneur efforts began as innovative ideas originated by 
groups. 
Two PMs (VADM Dyer and BGen Feigley) began working on their ideas before 
they were assigned as PM, the third, MG Snider, began working on his idea from the first 
day as PM. The PM who began his innovation attempt near the middle of his tenure used 
a borrowed innovation. 
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PMs had difficulty articulating whether their strategy was strictly formal or 
informal. One of the factors I used to determine formal or informal strategy was the PM's 
estimate of time spent on achieving the innovation. Considerable amounts of time are 
needed to formulate strategy, assess the strategy's effectiveness and to make adjustments 
based on the assessment. 
6.        Literature 
Data from the subjects' interview responses generally indicate that current public 
entrepreneur and innovation literature accurately describes and predicts that PMs use 
collective and individual forms of entrepreneurship to achieve their innovation and that 
PMs use informal strategies ("groping along") to achieve innovation. Additionally, 
through interviewees' descriptions of their innovation from start to finish, innovation 
phases described in the literature were validated. 
E.        POINTS OF DIVERGENCE 
Comparing the responses in Figure 10 also yields interesting points of divergence 
or differences. These differences are addresses first by category, then across categories. 
1.        Public Entrepreneur 
Both group and individual entrepreneurship models were demonstrated. Time 
spent on the idea varied dramatically from 50% throughout the PM's assignment, to a 
couple of hours for a few weeks. Time spent on the innovation is a likely indicator of the 
magnitude or scale of innovation attempted and should be used as a measure of the 
degree of innovation in further studies. VADM Dyer, MG Snider and BGen Feigley 
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reported significant investments in time to achieve their innovations. I feel this is due to 
the magnitude of change they introduced in the acquisition environment. 
PMs who didn't receive ideas from their predecessor passed on innovative ideas to 
their successors, but PMs who received innovative ideas from their predecessor did not 
leave ideas to their successors. This seems counter-intuitive. Wouldn't a PM who 
inherited innovative ideas be more likely to repeat this behavior if it proved successful? 
Why would PMs who didn't inherit innovative ideas pass ones on to their successors? I 
believe sharing innovative ideas has more to do with the personalities of the out-going 
and in-coming PMs and the special circumstances of a program. In only one case, the 
missile warranty innovation, did an innovative idea get passed from a PM to his 
successor and achieved~and this innovative idea transferred to the new PM via the 
program personnel, not PM to PM. 
2. Innovation 
Origins of innovative ideas were attributed to both individuals and groups. 
VADM Dyer's Competency Aligned Organization innovation was the only one that 
originated external to the program. Innovations occurred in programs throughout all 
phases of the acquisition process (CE through PF/DO&S) 
3. Barriers 
BGen Feigley focused on barriers to his innovation from within his program. The 
other four PMs were concerned with innovation barriers that were external to their 




Differing views on strategy and compromise were expressed. Only one PM, MG 
Snider, did not make any compromises to his original idea and did not make any changes 
to his innovation strategy. He believed that compromises would introduce more risk. 
Only one other PM, RDML Johnston, did not make any strategy changes because his 
strategy allowed for compromise in using opponents' criticism to improve the idea. 
PMs employed formal and informal strategies. At one extreme a complex, 
uncompromising strategy to redesign a program was articulated and at the other extreme 
a PM described a flexible strategy that would react to and incorporate opponents 
criticisms during the innovation's implementing phase. 
5. Intra-category 
The two group entrepreneurial innovations, VADM Dyer's Competency Aligned 
Organization and MG Snider's Comanche program redesign, used different strategies 
concerning opponents. VADM Dyer's strategy included solicitation of his proponents to 
influence the innovation's opponents. MG Snider's strategy didn't include soliciting 
proponents, yet his proponents were instrumental in accomplishing the innovation. 
It is apparent that there are relative differences in the magnitude of the 
innovations described by the five PMs. It is interesting to note the relationship between 
the magnitude of the innovation and the type of strategy used. I created an innovation 
and strategy comparison (Figure 11) to illustrate each innovation's relative magnitude and 




Formal Strategy tnlormal Strategy 
Figure 11. Innovation and Strategy Comparison 
6.   Literature 
PMs were successful in achieving innovation through formal and informal 
strategies and their innovations were both incremental and revolutionary.   This suggests 
that the "groping along" and "systematic analysis" methods of navigating the innovation 
process are both effective in acquisition programs. Judging from these five PMs and 
their innovations, it seems that the formal or analytical strategy is associated with a more 
revolutionary innovation while the less formal "tinkering" or "groping along" strategy 
was associated with a more incremental innovation. From a PM's perspective this makes 
sense. A PM thinks about "returns on investment". Therefore it would not make sense 
for a PM to spend time developing a formal strategy for an innovation that will only 
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produce incremental change, yet he would be willing to invest in a formal strategy that 
promises to pay off with revolutionary change. 
F.        CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Analysis of the data, provided by interviews of PMs who successfully managed 
innovation in their respective programs, yields interesting results. Innovative ideas were 
originated and propelled through the innovation process via individual and collective 
entrepreneurial efforts. Most PMs consider themselves entrepreneurs. All the 
innovations described by the interview subjects were process innovations and most 
originated from within the program. Innovations occurred in all phases of the acquisition 
process and ranged from revolutionary to incremental in their magnitude. For the most 
part, subjects' responses to the interview questions support current public 
entrepreneurship and innovation theory. However, two PMs demonstrated formal or 
analytical modes of entrepreneurship that arguably resulted in more revolutionary 
innovations. This is contrary to the prediction in the literature that managerial 
entrepreneurs use informal strategy ("groping along") and only produce incremental 
change. 
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VI.      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
We are proceeding into the future with astonishing velocity, 
so we have to continue tearing down archaic barriers and burdens, 
and harness the full potential of private industry, and to continue 
to answer enduring challenges with novel solutions. That's really 
the spirit defense acquisition reform. (Cohen, 1999) 
DoD continues to search for ways to improve the acquisition process. The 
primary goals of DoD's Acquisition Reform initiative are to reduce program cycle-time 
and cost. Many current practices, processes, and policies are not capable of achieving 
this goal; change is required. What Secretary Cohen calls "novel solutions" in his 
description of Acquisition Reform is a special kind of change-innovation. 
Central to accomplishing Acquisition Reform goals is the PM.   PMs are 
encouraged in the DoD 5000.1 to be innovative with respect to program cost and 
schedule. Little is contained in the DoD 5000 Series or any other acquisition manuals to 
assist the PM in understanding or achieving innovation. 
In an effort to create a body of knowledge useful to PMs who wish to innovate, 
five PMs who successfully managed innovation in their respective programs were chosen 
as subjects for this exploratory study. A questionnaire was administered to each PM in 
an interview. Interview responses where then analyzed and compared to determine if 
general themes or heuristics regarding innovation in acquisition programs can be 
developed. This chapter will summarize the study's findings based on the original 
research questions. 
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B.        RESTATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is: How do program managers 
(PMs) successfully manage innovation in defense acquisition programs? 
Secondary research questions include: 
1.   Who innovates in major defense acquisition programs? 
PMs successfully innovated using collective and individual entrepreneurial 
modes. PMs were successful in achieving innovation in situations with PEOs as 
proponents and opponents. Most innovations originated from with in the program office 
using group idea generation methods such as brainstorming. 
2.   What kinds of innovations occur in defense acquisition programs? 
All five innovations in the study were process innovations. They dealt with a new 
"means'* rather than new "ends" or product. Process innovation is to be expected from 
Government or DoD PMs since they are tasked with managing the program through the 
acquisition process, while the contractor-side of the program is responsible for the design, 
development, and manufacturing of the product or "ends". What remains to be validated 
is whether or not product innovations are more frequently achieved by contractor PMs. 
3.   What are the barriers to innovation in defense acquisition programs? 
Common barriers to innovation were expressed by the five PMs in this study. 
Inertia of the status quo, human tendencies to be risk-adverse, and the difficulty in 
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achieving consensus for decision-making were barriers described by most of the PMs in 
this thesis. 
4.   Do PMs use strategies to innovate? If so, what strategies do they use? What 
are the relationships between their strategies, innovations and environments? 
PMs in this study used strategies to achieve their innovations. PMs articulated 
both formal and informal strategies to achieving innovation, suggesting the "systematic 
analysis" method and the "groping along" method are both effective. All PMs described 
a strategy formulation process that, to varying degrees, took into account the pros and 
cons of the innovation, its proponents and opponents, and the barriers to achieving their 
innovation. 
C.       CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
"Best Practices" (Heuristics) 
1. When formulating innovation strategies, effective PMs assess environmental 
conditions such as barriers, proponents and opponents. Their strategies are then 
developed to make use of proponents, win over opponents, and navigate through or 
remove the barriers to achieving innovation. 
2. PMs who are new to a program are in the best position to innovate. Look within the 
program for "dormant" innovations. 
3. Effective innovation strategies usually include a component for communicating the 
innovation to persons within and outside the program. 
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4. Compromises to the original innovation may be required to achieve the innovation 
and, more importantly, the results of the innovation. 
5. Be prepared for adjustment to your innovation strategy, due to compromises to the 
innovation and changes in the environmental conditions, especially criticism from the 
innovation's opponents. 
6. Prototypes are an effective means to demonstrate the merits of an innovation, 
however some innovations cannot be prototyped. 
7. Modified and borrowed innovations may be easier to achieve than new innovations. 
New innovations require more time to implement, encounter greater barriers (such as 
power transfers), and entail greater risk if a prototype cannot be used. 
8. Innovations that introduce new "means" (process innovation) are more commonly 
achieved by military PMs than innovations that introduce a new "end" (product 
innovation). 
D.        LIMITATIONS 
There were several limitations affecting this study. They can be categorized into 
scope and resource limitations. Each limitation is discussed in greater detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
1. Scope Constraints 
The scope of this thesis focused on military PMs of MDAPs as public 
entrepreneurs, innovations they achieved, barriers they encountered, and strategies used 
to achieve innovations. It did not include additional analysis such as: 
•    each innovation's magnitude; 
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• other innovations achieved in the program or by the PM; 
• innovations or public entrepreneurship outside the uniformed DoD; or, 
• innovation attempts that were not successful. 
Such analysis would require in-depth case studies of each PM, each program, and each 
innovation. It must be stressed that the findings of this thesis are only preliminary. 
Further study in this area must be conducted to validate this study's findings. 
The scope of this thesis also shaped the questions asked in the interviews. 
Different questions would need to be asked to collect different data for additional 
analysis, extending the length of the interview. 
2.        Resource Constraints 
The interviews required a considerable amount of time, for both the researcher 
and the interview subjects. All the subjects interviewed held post-PM, executive-level 
billets with demanding schedules. It was not practical, or in some cases possible, for 
researcher or the interview subjects to increase the length of the interview. 
In addition to time, fiscal resource constraints limited the number of PMs 
interviewed. In most cases interview subjects were interviewed face-to-face at their place 
of work. Face-to-face interviews proved to be the best means of communicating between 
the interview subject and the researcher. However, additional interviews with subjects, 
or additional interview subjects, required travel funds that were outside the realm of 
possibility. 
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E.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis did not include civilian PMs within DoD, other PMs in the Federal 
Government, or the PM's counterpart on the contractor side of DoD programs. Further 
research that includes PMs from all these areas would help to build or validate innovation 
heuristics developed in this thesis. 
The major contribution of this thesis as an exploratory study is to develop an 
"acquisition innovation" body of knowledge that is useful to PMs and DoD acquisition 
officials. More research is needed to increase this body of knowledge to understand the 
nuances of public entrepreneurship and innovation in defense acquisition programs. 
Particularly interesting, and germane to Acquisition Reform goals, would be research 
focusing on PMs and innovations responsible for proven reductions in program cycle- 
time and cost. Equally interesting would be research that compared innovations achieved 
under different acquisition policies and regulations; i.e., innovations made in Advance 
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) programs, innovations in ACATII & III 
programs, and secret or so called "black" programs. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW SUBJECT QUESTIONNAIRE 
This appendix contains a copy of the questionnaire administered to the study 
subjects. The interviews with the study subjects lasted approximately 90-120 minutes, 
depending on the subject. 
1. Describe an innovation you made as a PM from "inception" to full 
implementation. 
2. What were the pros and cons of the innovation? 
3. What were the attitudes of your seniors, peers and subordinates toward your 
innovation? How did they change over time? 
4. Did you have a formal or informal plan to achieve this innovation? If so 
describe. How did the plan change over time? 
5. Did you develop some sort of proto-type for the innovation? (e.g., computer 
program, pilot program, model) 
6. Who were the innovation's proponents? 
7. How did you use the proponents to help you? 
8. Who were the innovation's opponents? 
9. How did you handle the opponents? 
10. Did your innovation work as anticipated? 
11. Were compromises a part of getting the innovation accepted? What were 
they? How much compromise of the original innovation was needed to 
achieve acceptance? How did you compromise? 
12. Where did the innovation originate? Was the idea borrowed from another 
area or context? 
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13. Did you inherit any innovative ideas from the previous PM? If so were you 
able to achieve them? Why or why not? 
14. Did you leave any unfinished innovation attempts for your successor? 
15. Do you consider yourself creative? An entrepreneur? 
16. What was the biggest barrier to achieving the innovation? 
17. How much time did you devote to the innovation? 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW SUBJECTS' BIOGRAPHIES 
Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer 
United States Navy 
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command 
Vice Admiral Joseph Dyer was born in Murphy, North 
Carolina. He was commissioned through the Aviation 
Reserve Officer Candidate Program following graduation 
from North Carolina State University with a Bachelor of 
Science Degree in Chemical Engineering. He received his 
wings in March 1971, and was selected as one of the first 
"Nuggets" (first tour aviators) to fly the Mach 2, RA-5C 
"Vigilante." He flew nationally tasked reconnaissance 
missions in both the Eastern and Western hemispheres. 
Following graduation at the United States Naval Test Pilot 
School, Paruxent River, Maryland, in June 1977 (Class 
71), he served aboard the Naval Air Test Center, Paruxent 
River, Maryland, in the Electronic Warfare and Reconnaissance and Carrier Suitability 
Branches. After 4 years at Paruxent River, Maryland, he attended Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, where he received a Masters of Science in Finance. 
From January 1981 until 1984, he was assigned to the Naval Weapons Center, China 
Lake, California, as the High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile Project Officer and test pilot 
for the initial weapons integration into the F/A-18. Next, he was assigned as 
Commanding Officer, Naval Plant Representative Office, Melbourne, Australia. There, 
he led a joint American and Australian team in managing the co-production of F/A-18's 
for the Royal Australian Air Force. 
Returning to the United States in January 1988, he attended the Defense Systems 
Management College. In May 1988, he was posted as the Deputy Program Manager for 
the F/A-18 at the Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C. In that position, he led 
the team that developed the concept for the F/A-18E/F and spearheaded the first tactical 
aviation, data fusion efforts. 
He was the Executive Assistant to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 
Washington, D.C, from March 1990 until July 1992. Subsequently, he served as the 
Navy's Chief Test Pilot and commanded the Flight Test and Engineering Group, Naval 
Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Paruxent River, Maryland. From January 1994 to 
April 1997, he served as F/A-18 Program Manager leading the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (E&MD) effort on the new F/A-18E/F, the continued 
production and fleet support of the F/A-18C/D and all F/A-18 Foreign Military Sales. 
The F/A-18 program won the Department of Defense Acquisition Excellence Award and 
the Order of Daedalian during this period. Vice Admiral Dyer was assigned as the 
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Commander, Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland, in 
July 1997 and one month later assumed additional responsibilities as the Naval Air 
Systems Command, Assistant Commander for Research and Engineering. In June 2000, 
he was assigned as the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command. 
He is an Associate Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots. His decorations 
include three Legion of Merit medals. 
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Major General James R. Snider 
United States Army 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development & Acquisition 
Major General James R. Snider was born in Columbus, 
Ohio. He graduated from the United States Military 
Academy with a Bachelor of Science Degree and was 
commissioned a Second Lieutenant in Armor in June 1970. 
General Snider has a Master of Science Degree in 
Aeronautical Engineering and a PhD in Aerospace 
Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. His military education includes the 
Defense Systems Management College Advanced Program 
Managers Course, the Command and General Staff College, 
and he is al994 graduate of the Army War College. 
General Snider was appointed as Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Research, Development and Acquisition, Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
(AMC) on 13 September 2000. In this position, he directs the integration and 
administration of AMC s research, development, and acquisition programs that sustain 
the soldier's technological edge and facilitates the vision for Army Transformation. 
Following completion of the Armor Basic Course, Airborne School, and Ranger School, 
he was assigned as a Platoon Leader in the Third Infantry Division in Schweinfurt, 
Germany. He completed Flight School in December 1972 and was assigned to the Third 
Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas. Following Command and General Staff College, 
he served on the Army Staff in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition. 
After advanced civil schooling in 1989, General Snider served as the Deputy Program 
Manager for the National Test Bed in the Strategic Defense Initiative Office at Falcon 
AFB, Colorado. In 1990, he was selected as the first Product Manager for the Longbow 
Apache Program, and then served as the Program Manager for Apache from 1992 to 
1994. Following selection to Brigadier General, he was named as the Comanche Program 
Manager. General Snider was assigned as the Program Executive Officer for Aviation in 
1997 and served in that position until his assignment at AMC in August 2000. 
His military awards include the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Defense 
Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the 
Army Commendation Medal, Parachutists Badge, Senior Army Aviator Badge, Ranger 
Tab, and the Army Staff Identification Badge. 
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Brigadier General James M. Feigley 
United States Marine Corps 
Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command 
Brigadier General Feigley is the Commander, Marine Corps 
Systems Command, Quantico, VA. 
Brigadier General Feigley was born on February 10,1950 in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He joined the Marine Corps' Platoon 
Leaders Class pre-commissioning program in December 1969 
while an undergraduate student at the University of 
Wisconsin-Oshkosh. After receiving his Bachelor of Science 
Degree in 1972, he was commissioned a second lieutenant and 
attended Infantry Officers Training at The Basic School, 
Quantico, VA. He is also a graduate of the Amphibious 
Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 
and the Defense Systems Management College. 
After completion of The Basic School in 1973, he was ordered to the Third Marine 
Division in Okinawa, Japan and was assigned as a Tracked Vehicle Platoon Commander 
with the First Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Subsequent command and staff tours include: 
Recruit Series Commander and Officer In Charge of the Physical Training Unit, Marine 
Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California; Company Executive Officer, Company 
Commander, and Battalion Operations Officer, Second Assault Amphibian Battalion, 
Second Marine Division; Company Commander, First Tracked Vehicle Battalion, Third 
Marine Division; Liaison Officer and Project Manager, Naval Training Equipment 
Center, Orlando, Florida; Project Officer, Weapons Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Installations and Logistics, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps; Project Officer, Armored 
Combat Vehicle Directorate, Marine Corps Research, Development and Acquisition 
Command; Advanced Amphibious Vehicle Project Officer, Naval Sea Systems 
Command; and the Assistant Program Manager, Department of the Navy, Direct 
Reporting Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault. From June 1993 to August 
1998, he was assigned as the Program Manager for the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle. 
He was selected for Brigadier General in March 1998 and was assigned to his present 
command in August 1998. 
Brigadier General Feigley's personal decorations include the Legion of Merit, 
Meritorious Service Medal with gold star, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation 
Medal, and Navy Achievement Medal with gold star. 
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Rear Admiral Charles H. Johnston 
United States Navy 
Commander, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division 
Rear Admiral Charles H. Johnston, Jr., became 
Commander, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division 
in January 1999. He joined the Navy through the Aviation 
Officer Candidate Program and was commissioned in 
October 1973. He received a master's degree in 
Aeronautical Systems from the University of West Florida 
while earning his Naval Aviator Wings. 
Rear Adm. Johnston served in Attack Squadron 15 aboard 
USS America (CV-66) flying the A-7E Corsair. He next 
reported to Attack Squadron 174 as an instructor pilot and 
weapons training officer. In 1981 he was accepted as an 
Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer. His subsequent sea 
duty was in the Air Department aboard USS Forrestal 
(CV59). After receiving a master's degree in Aeronautical Engineering (Avionics) from 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., he graduated from the U.S. Naval Test 
Pilot School in 1986. He served as F/A-18 Project Director, Ordnance Branch Head, and 
Chief Test Pilot, Systems Engineering Test Directorate at the Naval Air Test Center. 
In 1989 Rear Adm. Johnston reported to the Naval Plant Representative Office, 
Melbourne, Australia, as the Executive Officer and later served as Commanding Officer. 
From 1992 to 1995 he served as Deputy for Production and Systems Development in the 
F/A-18 Program Office under the Program Executive Officer (Tactical Aircraft Program). 
Rear Adm. Johnston next served as the Military Director for Systems Engineering and 
later as the Director of Engineering for the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division. 
In August 1996 he became Program Manager for Conventional Strike Weapons under the 
Program Executive Officer (Tactical Aircraft Program). 
Rear Adm. Johnston has flown in excess of 3,000 flight hours in over 30 models of fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft. He has been awarded the Legion of Merit, the Navy Meritorious 
Service Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal, the Navy Achievement Medal and nine 
unit commendation/campaign awards. 
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Colonel David Matthews 
United States Army, Retired 
Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School 
COL Dave Matthews, U.S. Army (Ret.) B.A. 1966, M.A. 
1974. COL Matthews is a graduate of the U.S. Army War 
College and the Defense Systems Management College. 
A career logistician, he served successively in the office of 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, HQ, Department of 
the Army; Chief of the Logistics Division, Multiple 
Launch Rocket System PMO; Commander of the U.S. 
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